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Abstract
Economic sanctions are a widely used, yet controversial international policy
tool. This paper aims to examine the trade deflecting effects of Russian sent
import sanctions on the Finnish exports. This effect is analyzed by estimating
a gravity equation of trade by applying Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood
and Ordinary Least Squares estimators. The data covers Finnish exports in
the sanctioned product groups and a control group to 41 destinations from
January 2013 to December 2016. A trade deflecting effect is found but the
analysis fails to estimate the magnitude accurately.
Keywords: Sanctions, Trade Deflection, Trade Destruction, Gravity Model,
Trade Policy
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1 Introduction
Economic sanctions are used for long time in cases where military interventions
are not considered to be feasible. Notable crises in the 20th century where eco-
nomic sanctions were imposed include the Italian-Abyssinian conflict, Rhodesian
civil war, Cuban missile crisis and sanctions sent to the South African Apartheid
government. Although economic sanctions are not a novel political instrument, the
usage increased progressively in the 20th century and is strongly present in the cur-
rent international politics as well. After the Second World War United States has
been the largest individual sender of sanctions and after the end of Cold War also
the United Nations Security Council has frequently used sanctions as a policy tool
(Caruso, 2005).
In the emergence of the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, the West
reacted by imposing series of economic and political sanctions on Russian companies
and individuals. In response, Russia introduced its counter-sanctions on EU, US,
Canada and others participating in the anti-Russian sanctions. By the presidential
decree no. 778 on 7th of August in 2014 Russia imposed a ban on several agricultural
products coming from the countries originally imposing sanctions on Russia (See
Appendix A).
The essay contributes to the academic discussion of negative trade policies’ effect
on trade and the topic of sanction effectiveness by assessing the trade destructive and
deflecting effects in the case of export sanctions. Sanctions are designed to harm
or signal the target country, so trade destruction is a desired effect of sanctions.
However, if the target of the sanctions can circumvent the sanctions by deflecting
exports to other trading partners, the sanctions are more probable to be ineffective.
The aim of the essay is to first measure trade destruction of the Finnish exports
and thereafter to assess whether trade was deflected or not. Trade destruction is
measured by the drop in exports after the implementation of sanctions via a de-
scriptive statistics approach. The trade deflection effect is assessed by difference-in-
differences panel estimation of the gravity equation of trade. Considering theoretical
framework and previous empirical research, trade deflection to other trading part-
ners is expected to rise in case of increase in trade barrier between one partner, the
sender of the sanctions in this case. The data covers Finnish exports to 41 des-
tinations: EU countries, OECD countries and Russian Federation over the period
January 2013 to December 2016.
The essay is structured as follows: Second chapter describes economic sanctions
in general terms, and in the context of this essay and provides literature review of the
factors contributing to sanction success. Third chapter covers the empirical strategy.
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The fourth chapter is the data and descriptive statistics of the trade destruction and
possible deflection. Fifth chapter covers the assessment of trade deflection effects
through a panel estimation of the gravity equation complemented with robustness
checks. Sixth chapter is the conclusions.
2 Economic Sanctions
Economic sanctions consists of a broad set of measures to achieve political or eco-
nomic goals. Barber (1979) defines economic sanctions as economic measures di-
rected to political objectives and adds that sanctions may be complemented with
other measures of coercion, such as severance of diplomatic or cultural ties. Eco-
nomic sanctions can be divided in three categories: boycotts, embargoes and finan-
cial sanctions (Caruso, 2003). In a boycott imposing country restricts the import
of one or more goods from the target country or countries in order to lower the de-
mand of the targeted products and therefore inflict economic damage. Embargo is
the opposite of the first category, since there exports to target country are restricted
completely or partially. Financial sanctions consist of restriction or suspension of
lending and investing to the target country, preventing the investing of target coun-
try to the sender countries or freezing the target’s foreign assets. The sanctions
sent on Russia are a combination of all of these measures whereas the Russian
counter-sanctions are narrower and only boycotting imports of the selected agri-
cultural and food industry products. From EU’s and its allies point of view these
counter-sanctions are viewed as export sanctions.
According to Barber (1979) sanctions can be looked in three different ways: num-
ber of states involved, comprehensiveness and the authority behind the sanctions.
These three dimensions span from unilateral to universal, selective to comprehen-
sive, and recommendation to mandatory, respectively. The sanctions sent on Russia
are multilateral, selective by nature, or "smart", since they are targeted at few
critical sectors, such as energy and warfare, and supported with personal travel re-
strictions for selected Russian citizens. The sanctions are mandatory for businesses
in countries that are committed to enforce the sanctions on Russia. The Russian
counter-sanctions are unilaterally imposed, are selective, facing only few agricultural
and food industries, and mandatory.
I will use “economic sanctions” and “sanctions” interchangeably. Additionally, I
will refer to the imposer of the sanctions and to whom they are targeted as “the
sender” and “the target”, respectively. Also, when speaking of sanctions sent by
Russian Federation (from now on, Russia), I will refer to them as "Russian counter-
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sanctions" or "counter-sanctions".
2.1 Motivation behind Russian Counter-sanctions
The traditional motivation behind economic sanctions is based on the assumed re-
lationship between economic activity and political behavior (Barber, 1979). Early
example of this relationship was presented by Galtung (1967) as a simple causal
relationship where economic punishment leads to economic turmoil, which leads to
disintegration within the political leadership, which finally leads to compliance. In
the later literature this simple causality is challenged. Pape (1997) criticizes this
“causal logic of the theory of economic sanctions”. The assumption of a straight-
forward relationship between economic sanctions and political behavior is a simple
answer to why sanctions are so often imposed when unwanted political behavior
is confronted, but there is no theoretical link between economic sanctions and the
change of political behavior. Also Baldwin (1998) challenges this simplification and
underlines that there is hardly, if at all, a consistent theory of such causal mecha-
nism. Therefore, I will not make any claims of such theoretical links in this paper
but refer to the empirical findings of the literature and use those as the framework
and analyze against I will analyze my findings.
To better understand the motivation behind sanction imposing, Barber (1979)
divides the objectives of economic sanctions in three categories: primary, secondary
and tertiary objectives. Primary objectives relate to the actions and behavior of
the target state. Secondary objectives relate to status, behavior and expectations
of the sender state. Lastly, tertiary objectives relate to structure and operation of
the international system as a whole.
Primary objectives are the ones that are publicly outspoken goals of the sanctions
to affect the targets behavior. Although the primary objectives are often in line
with the publicly announced objectives, sometimes the primary goal differs from
the outspoken motive for sanctions. The import ban statement stated that the
import ban of certain agriculture products is based on the concerns of food safety
and food price increases caused by the import of foreign products. However, one
could argue that the motivation is more to counter-act on the sanctions targeted
on Russia (Veebel and Markus, 2015). From the perspective of international law
Russia is violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity but Russia consider interventions
in other countries justifiable if it concerns defending a minority of Russian citizens,
as was in the case of annexation of Crimean Peninsula. The primary goal of the
Russian counter-sanctions is therefore to punish the EU and its allies for meddling
with Russian politics (Veebel and Markus, 2015).
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The secondary objectives of the sanctions are those that relate to the status of
the sender. Barber (1979) stresses that they are as important as the primary ones.
The secondary objectives are often motivated by the concerns that if no action is
taken a loss of credibility among the sender state or states can occur and this loss
of credibility can be costlier than the price of the sanctions (Klinova and Sidorova,
2016). In the Russian counter-sanctions the secondary objectives are motivated by
the fear to been seen as weak under the western pressure and to reinforce the trust
in the regime to act when Russian citizens are threatened. Khoklov and Sidorova
(2015) also argue that Russia did not expect as harsh reaction from the western
states as eventually emerged but instead believed that the economic interests would
outweigh the political ones. In addition to the primary objective, to punish the
western "aggressors", Russian leadership believed that they had to act in order to
not appear weak in the eyes of their own citizens and the global community.
The tertiary objectives of are those which relate to wider international aspects.
Barber (1979) described them as objectives that relate to the structure and function
of the international system. For example in the Cuban crisis, stopping the spreading
of communism was a tertiary objective for the U.S. (Barber, 1979). The Russian
tertiary objective could arguably be to enforce the collaboration of the former soviet
republics and to signal to the western countries that EU’s expansion to the east,
with the addition of its military collaboration, is not taken lightly.
To conclude, the motivation behind the Russian counter-sanctions were to punish
the parties condemning the Russian actions as interfering with the Russian internal
affairs.
2.2 Success of Economic Sanctions?
In addition to the political analysis of motivation behind sanctions, there is a broad
literature concerning the success of economic sanctions. The famous work of Huf-
bauer et al. (1990) found that almost 30 percent of sanctions do lead to compliance.
However, later research finds many of their results to be methodologically insufficient
and that the number is likely to be exaggerated (Drury 1998; Dreger et al. 2015).
The general consensus is that economic sanctions are not very successful when seek-
ing policy change but that they sometimes still succeed. The determinants of the
success are studied in numerous empirical studies, from which I will shortly discuss
the most significant ones.
The traditional thinking that the determinant contributing most to the success
of sanctions is their ability to cause costs high enough to the target. This argument
is strongly backed by several studies (Lam 1990; Drury 1998; Lektzian and Souva
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2007; Allen 2005). With more caution, Morgan and Schwebach (1997) argue that
sanctions are not notably successful policy tools in general, but if the costs to the
target are "extreme" the sanctions may lead to compliance. Few studies, such as
Bonetti (1998) and Jing et al. (2003) also find the coefficients to be near zero 1. In
majority of studies the traditional thinking is still proven to bear truth so it is fairly
safe to say that target cost is a robust determinant of sanction success.
Some researchers argue that multilaterally sent sanctions outperform unilaterally
sent (Martin 1993; Allen 2008; Lektzian and Souva 2007). The intuition is that
multilaterally sent sanctions are harder to circumvent and therefore more effective.
However, others find no evidence for this claim and argue that multilateral coalitions
are hard to maintain, hence they are not likely to succeed (Jing et al. 2003; Drezner
2000). The intuition is still not completely wrong and when controlling for the
involvement of international organizations, multilateral sanctions are found to be
more successful (Drury, 1998; Drezner, 2000; Bapat et al., 2013). International
organizations can coordinate and give legitimacy for the sanctions which prevent
the back-sliding of some hesitant senders, which can lead, according to Drezner
(2000), to the collapse of the whole cooperation. Therefore, the involvement of an
international organization is important if sanctions are sent multilaterally.
A number of other determinants are also argued to have effect on sanction suc-
cess, but the research is mostly inconclusive in these. Some claim that sanctions
sent towards an ally is the key to success, while others do not find proof for that 2.
Although costly sanctions are widely agreed to be more successful, some point out
that even greater success is achieved when the costs are borne by the right people
in the target state 3.
One reason for the inconclusiveness in the research of sanction success is the
different definitions of sanction success but maybe the more significant is the dif-
ferent methodologies in the research. Bapat et al. (2013) cling to this issue by
using 18 independent variables frequent in research of sanction success and running
Bernoulli-logistic regression on every possible combination of these and then report
the distributions of the coefficients and t-statistics for each of the variables. They
find that only target costs and involvement of international organization are robust
positive determinants of sanctions, and some such as target trade dependence are
weakly robust.
To conclude, the literature is quite inconclusive on the expected effects of var-
1In both studies the coefficients are insignificant.
2Positive relationship: Lam (1990), Allen (2005). Insignificant: Drury (1998), Bapat et al.
(2013). Negative relationship: Early (2011)
3see Lam (1990); Morgan and Schwebach (1996)
9
ious factors on sanctions but it is safe to say that target costs and involvement of
international organization are considered to attribute most to success. However,
when seeking compliance, one must to remember that despite these two factors in-
crease the likelihood of success, economic sanctions are in general considered to be
ineffective as policy tools.
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3 Empirical approach
To assess trade destruction and deflection, as in earlier studies, first provide de-
scriptive statistics of trade destruction and thereafter estimate a gravity equation
to analyze if the destructed trade has deflected to other trading partners. If the
sanctioned exports are deflected to Finland’s other trading partners, the effect of
the sanctions is arguably not as severe for Finland as the deflection mitigates losses.
I will follow the definition used by Bown and Crowley (2007) and Haidar (2017)
of export deflection as a change in the destination of exports due to increase in a
trade barrier in another market as when a rise in tariff on a export from country A to
country B causes the the exports to be sold instead to country C. Export destruction
is equally defined as a reduction in exports following an increase in trade barrier.
Sanctions act equivalent to tariffs, and so as trade barriers, are expected to deflect
trade to third countries and destruct exports to the sender.
Haidar (2017) found that the export sanctions sent on Iran led to first export de-
struction of the flows to sender countries but two thirds of the destructed flows were
deflected to non-sanctioning countries. In addition, trade destructive and deflecting
effect is studied through the analysis of other import-restricting trade policies such
as duties and tariffs. For example, Bown and Crowley (2007) analyzed the effects
of US anti-dumping duties on Japanese exports to third party countries and found
that these duties lead to both trade destruction and deflection. Chandra (2017)
found similar evidence from the temporary trade restrictions imposed on China by
its trading partners: Chinese exports to countries imposing restrictions decreased
around 35 % and when a restriction was imposed on other countries, the Chinese
trade to the imposing country increased around 30 %. Sanctions are by definition
trade restrictions, so by analogy they are ought to cause similar effects on the trade
flows.
In this section I will present the gravity equation, issues related to its estimation
and ways to overcome them, how sanctions enter the gravity equation and finally
the specifications to assess the trade deflecting effects of sanctions.
3.1 Gravity Equation
In the gravity model of trade attraction is measured as trade flow between two
partners, mass as the economic size of the partners, and distance as the business
distance between the partners. In its application to international trade it says that
countries trade in proportion to their GDP and distance. Simplified, large economies
trade more and countries close to each other have larger bilateral trade compared
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to countries far apart. In empirical literature, the GDP’s and distance between
partners are found to be the main determinants in explaining trade flows. Other
factors unanimously agreed upon to have significant and robust effect on trade within
the gravity model are common border, language, colonial history, to name few.
As an empirical model, the gravity model of trade is proved to be successful in
economics and is extensively used to analyze various institutions’ and policies’ effects
on trade flows (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) stress that the early attempts to model trade flows with gravity equation
have no theoretical basis and the first theoretical foundation to be given to the
gravity model was by Anderson (1979). The assumptions Anderson (1979) made
were product differentiation by place of origin (Armington assumption, Armington
(1969)) and constant elasticity of substitution (CES) expenditures, and is therefore
called the Armington-CES model. This model rose to popularity after Anderson and
Wincoop (2003) influential paper giving a more concrete explanation and estimation
method for the effects of trade costs4.
The gravity equation presented by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) explains
trade flows from country i to country j as follows:
xij =
yiyj
yw
(
tij
ΠiPj
)1−σ (1)
where
Πi = (
∑
i
(tij/Pj)
1−σθj)1/(1−σ) (2)
Pj = (
∑
i
(tij/Πi)
1−σθi)1/(1−σ) (3)
In the above equations Πi and Pj are called the "multilateral resistance" terms
(MLR), and are part of the trade cost term, ( tij
ΠiPj
)1−σ. The first, Πi, is the outward
MLR’s and measures importer j’s ease of market access. Similarly, Pj is defined as
the inward MLR’s and measures exporter i’s ease of market access. The bilateral
trade cost between partners i and j, tij, is approximated by various geographic and
trade policy variables. There is various ways for controlling for the multilateral trade
resistances but it has to be done indirectly, since they are theoretical constructs.
The effect on bilateral trade between i and j is affected by the MLR’s in a fairly
intuitive way: the larger the MLR of exporter i are with its all trading partners,
the smaller the relative bilateral resistance is with the importer j. In other words,
4According to Arkolakis et al. (2013) multiple models with different micro-foundations (such
as Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardian frameworks, and sectoral Armington model) have been used to
derive the gravity equation capturing the trade gains equally to the Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) Armington-CES model.
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the relative price is cheaper with two trading partners when there is a multilateral
barrier with all other trading partners, after controlling for size with yiyj
yw
.
A practical feature of the structural model of gravity theory is that it is separable
so that bilateral expenditures are separable from output and expenditure at the
country level (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004; Anderson and Yotov, 2008; Larch
and Yotov, 2016b). That makes the model applicable to analyzing the trade on
sectoral levels, which is often valuable since different product groups may be affected
differently under a trade policy. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) augmented their
original structural gravity equation with country-level output, yki , and expenditure,
ykj , where k is the class of goods. The sectoral gravity equation is as follows:
xkij =
yki y
k
j
yk
(
tkij
ΠkiP
k
j
)1−σk (4)
The key differences in the sectoral gravity equation is that the multilateral resis-
tances and that the trade costs, tkij, are sector-specific as well.
3.2 Sanctions and Gravity Equation
Sanctions enter the gravity equation as trade costs when analyzing the effects of
those said sanctions. The unobservable trade cost factor, tij, or bilateral trade
resistance with sanctions included is modeled as
tkij = bijd
ρ
ij (5)
so that tij is a log-linear function of observables, bilateral distance dij, and variable
bij which takes value 1 if i and j are located in the same country, and 1 plus tariff
equivalent otherwise. Other variables have been found to be significant coefficients
as explaining the trade costs, such as common language and former colonial relation-
ship. The question of interest here is how the sanctions enter the trade cost factor.
As previously explained, the multilateral resistances affect the relative prices. I write
again the outward multilateral resistance to show how sanctions affect the relative
prices and therefore lead to either trade destruction or deflection
Πi = (
∑
i
(tij/Pj)
1−σθi)1/(1−σ) (6)
Sanctions cause trade destruction if exports from i to j decrease due to the increase
in trade costs, tkij. Trade deflection is similarly caused by the increase in tkij due
to the increase in Πki . When the multilateral resistance with country j increases,
the relative MLR with all other trading partners decrease. Hence, sanctions effects’
work through affecting these relative prices. The following example sheds light on
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the mechanism. When sanctions are imposed on the selected product groups the
trade flows to the sender of these products dries up. This means that the trade
with other countries becomes relatively cheaper, since the sanctions increases the
bilateral resistance between the sender and the target and therefore decrease the
multilateral resistance towards all other trading partners. Hence, sanctions should
deflect trade from the target country to its other trading partners when sanctions
are imposed on a country, since the trade barrier increases between the sender and
target.
3.3 Issues regarding Gravity Equation estimation
As previously explained, multilateral resistances are vital to provide theory consis-
tent estimates of trade effects when estimating the gravity equation. Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003) originally use non-linear least squares (NLS) method to obtain
estimates for MLR terms when estimating the structural form of gravity model. The
NLS method is computationally challenging, so various other methods are used to
approximate the MLR’s. Several researchers use a reduced form of the structural
gravity equation and approximate the MLR terms with "remoteness index", con-
structed as a function of bilateral distances and GDP’s and estimated with ordinary
least squares (e.g. Baier and Bergstrand, 2009). Hovewer, this approach is criticized
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), since estimations with MLR and remoteness
index gives significantly different results. Olivero and Yotov (2012) show that by
controlling for the MLR terms with exporter and importer fixed effects in cross-
section studies and exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects in panel studies
gives results that are consistent with the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) results.
In addition, to account for the MLR’s, the usage of exporter-time and importer-time
fixed effects also absorbs the size (GDP) variables from the structural gravity model
as well as all other observable and unobservable country- and time-specific charac-
teristics. Hence, the traditional gravity variables are omitted from the estimation
when using fixed effects.
To achieve unbiased estimators, the most appropriate method is to estimate the
reduced form of the structural gravity equation with the importer- and exporter-time
fixed effects with Pseudo Poisson Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) estimator (Faully,
2015). However, due to convergence issues when estimating using the PPML re-
gressor, I use destination-product fixed effects and time fixed effects separately.
This leads to somewhat different result, since time-varying variables such as GDP
are not absorbed by the fixed effects. Therefore, I will also estimate the gravity
equation with OLS with the recommended importer- and exporter-time fixed effects
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for robustness comparison, in addition to using the same FE’s than in the PPML
estimation.
Another issue with trade data estimation is the often frequent zero observations
in one or multiple country pairs in some point or points in the sample period.
This occurrence of zero trade flows increases when dealing with disaggregated data,
sectoral or regional for example, since the more specific and smaller in size the units
are the larger the possibility that there is no trade in the group or that the flows are
not measured (Anderson, 2010). Traditional method of estimating gravity equations
logarithmic transformation with OLS is problematic in the presence of zero trade
flows, since the transformation drops the zeros off the data. There are multiple
methods to handle data in presence of zero trade flows, such as substituting zero
trade flows with a small value (such as 1), Tobit estimation (see Eaton and Tamura,
1995; Martin and Pham, 2008), two-stage selection process (see Helpman et al.,
2008) and PPML estimation of the gravity equation in its multiplicative form as
shown by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Although the occurrence of zero trade
flows is not large in the dataset, while some 15 % of the observed trade flows are
zero, it is good to account for. First, I will estimate the gravity equation with PPML
where the zero trade flows are included as they are. Thereafter I replace the zero
trade flows with 1 and run OLS estimations of the log-linearized specification. For
robustness check I also run OLS where the zero trade flows are excluded.
Third issue with trade data is the presence of heteroscedasticity, so that OLS
estimation gives biased and inefficient estimates (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).
This problem can be overcome by estimating the gravity equation so that the de-
pendent variable, that is trade, is size-adjusted as in Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) and using NLS estimation or by applying the PPML estimator to estimate
the gravity equation as proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). From these
two approaches the latter is preferable, since, as previously explained, it can account
for the zero trade flows, is usable with fixed effects and requires less computational
powers than the NLS method. Thereafter I compare the results with the various
OLS estimation results.
3.4 Model specification for Trade Deflection
The specification I estimate with PPML estimator is the following:
Exportsijpt = exp(β1 + β2lnGDPj + β3DID + µjp + λt)j (7)
where i denotes Finland, j denotes the partner, p is the product class, that is
sanctioned or not, and t is the month where the exports are measured. DID is the
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interaction between the sanction dummy and the post-sanction dummy, Sanction×
Post, and its coefficient β3 is the one of main interest in the estimation. The
destination-product fixed effects are denoted by µjp and the time-fixed effects by
λt. The last term, j, denotes the errors. The standard errors are clustered on the
partner level because I am concerned that the products export behavior is correlated
in the same destinations.
Destination-product fixed effects controls for time-invariant aspects on the destination-
product level. In addition these effects control for traditional gravity variables such
as distance, common border, common language etcetera, which are therefore ex-
cluded from the specification5. Time-fixed effects control for everything that varies
over time, such as trends in export flows, GDP and population.
After controlling for all time-variant and -invariant aspects with fixed effects, the
variable left is the predictor of interest, DID, that is the difference-in-differences
coefficient. It shows if the expected mean change in outcome from before the sanc-
tions to post sanction introduction was different in the control and treatment group.
If positive, it is evidence of trade deflection.
In addition to the PPML estimation, I will run four different OLS estimations.
The difference in the specification is that the dependent variable, exports, is in
logarithms:
lnExportsijpt = β1 + β2lnGDPj + β3DID + µjp + λt + jt (8)
The first two estimations include the same clustering of standard errors as the
PPML, that is on partner level and in the latter two the errors are clustered on
partner-time level. This is due concerns that the errors are not only correlated in
the same destinations but specifically in destination-time pairs. With both types of
clustering, one OLS regression is run with zero trade included and the other with
zero trade excluded.
5These variables would be perfectly collinear with the fixed effects dummies.
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4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Data sources and construction of the panel
The data covers Finnish exports to 41 destinations: EU countries, OECD countries
and Russian Federation over the period January 2013 to December 2016. Figures
are obtained from the Finnish customs statistical database. The data is in four-
dimensional panel format. The dimensions are reporter (i), partner (j), product
class (k) and time (t). Reporter is Finland in all 3936 observations. Product class is
either sanctioned or non-sanctioned. The dependent variable is Exportsijpt, that is
sanctioned or non-sanctioned trade from Finland to its trading partner j in month
t measured in current euros.
Table 1: Variables
Variables Definition Unit
Exports Value of exports to destination j in time t Thousand euro
GDP GDP in destination j Thousand euro
Treatment Dummy variable taking value 1 Dummy (0/1)
if the product class is sanctioned
Post Dummy variable taking value 1 Dummy (0/1)
if month is after the sanction imposing
DID The interaction dummy variable Dummy (0/1)
of Treatment and Post
Treatment is a dummy-variable taking value 1 if the export flows consist of sanc-
tioned product groups and zero otherwise, working as the nominator of treatment
and control group, respectively. The treatment group of sanctioned flows is aggre-
gated from the industry specific sanctioned export flows at CN4 level based on the
Russian decree imposing the sanctions6. The control group of non-sanctioned prod-
ucts is compiled from the CN4 groups including the sanctioned products as well
from where the sanctioned flows are subtracted. I believe this approach to generate
the control group is reasonable from two reasons. First, the control group consist
of products that are similar to the sanctioned ones so that they can be expected
to have similar export trends. Second, the export flows of the treatment and con-
trol group are approximately equally sized so there is less probability for scaling
6Combined nomenclature (CN) system is a product classification system created on the basis
of Harmonized System (HS) by the European Commission (see Council Regulation (EEC) No
2658/87).
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problems when estimating the gravity equation7.
Table 2: Export destinations
Australia* Denmark* Israel Netherlands* Slovenia*
Austria* Estonia* Italy* New Zealand South Korea
Belgium* France* Japan Norway* Spain*
Bulgaria* Germany* Latvia* Poland* Sweden*
Canada* Greece* Lithuania* Portugal* Switzerland
Chile Hungary* Luxembourg* Romania* Turkey
Croatia* Iceland* Malta* Russia United Kingdom*
Cyprus* Ireland* Mexico Slovakia* United States*
Czech Republic*
*Facing counter-sanctions
I followed the official list of sanctioned products (see Appendix 1) as precisely
as possible, although there are some differences in the data and actual flows. First,
all dairy products except lactose-free products are banned from imports. However,
lactose-free products are not separately specified in the CN-system so they remained
in the sanctioned flows. Second, the official list includes some products in 10-digit
level when the Finnish customs measures flows up to 8-digit level. These product
groups are not separately specified in the data but included as their 8-digit level
super-group. These also explain why the sanctioned export flows are not exactly
zero as seen from the graphs following section.
The trade flows of each sanctioned CN6-class are aggregated to form a group
called "sanctioned" and the control group, called "non-sanctioned", is compiled
from the CN4-product groups which include the sanctioned product groups. The
aggregated amount of the sanctioned trade flows are then subtracted from the
non-sanctioned trade flows to generate an appropriate control group for the use
of difference-in-differences estimation. The choice of control group is chosen as
the trade of similar product groups can be predicted to behave similarly than
the trade in sanctioned product groups. The panel data is constructed to satisfy
exporter-partner-time-product group dimensions, where the trade flows are observed
on monthly basis stretching from January 2013 to December 2016. As mentioned in
the first chapter, the Russian counter-sanctions were imposed on August 2014, so
the trade to Russia after that time-period are expected to take values of zero.
GDP figures for the partners are obtained from Eurostat. The figures are at
7The mean of treatment and control group is approx 990 000 euros and approx 2 290 000 euros,
respectively.
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quarterly frequency and measured in current euros. Figures for 2013 to 2015 are
actual and for 2016 estimates. Eurostat lacks the figures for United States, Canada
and Chile, so these are excluded from the data set8. When running the estimations,
these countries are dropped.
4.2 Descriptive statistics of trade destruction and deflection
I will start by graphical analysis to search if there is a trade destructive effect and
if there is, move to analyzing if the trade deflected.
The export destructing effect of the sanctions is observable from figure 1, where
the period where the sanctions were imposed is marked with a vertical line. The
exports of the sanctioned product groups dries up almost immediately after the
Russian ban on selected foodstuff categories is imposed9. The drop is almost 99
% between the periods before and after the counter-sanctions. This drop could be
explained by the sanctions, since exporting was not possible after the implementation
of these import restrictions.
Figure 1: Sanctioned exports to Russia in the sample period
What is surprising, is the simultaneous drop in the exports of the control group
as well, as seen in Figure 2. The drop is around 68 %, which is a substantial amount
and cannot be explained by the sanctions. The drop in the control group may be
explained by the coinciding collapse of ruble and the drop in crude oil prices, which
led to Russian financial crisis10. Other studies suggest likewise that the overall
decline in exports to Russia is caused in major parts by the decline in Russian
8These values were not retrievable as current dollars or euros from national sources, either.
9Note that the exports that are still observable in the graph are those of the exempted sub-
categories, that is lactose free products and foodstuff used in the production of baby food.
10See Dreger et al. (2016) for more information on the effects of exchange rate fluctuation and
decrease in oil prices on Russian exports and imports.
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purchase power (Berg-Andersson and Kotilainen, 2016; Crozet and Hintz, 2016).
Figure 2: Non-sanctioned exports to Russia in the sample period
The sudden drop of exports in the sanctioned product groups suggests that there was
a trade destructive effect caused by the sanctions. Since there was a simultaneous
and substantial drop in the control group as well, there were other forces affecting
the decline in trade in addition to the sanctions. However, there is still a significant
relative difference between the sanctioned and non-sanctioned product groups. This
points to the direction that sanctions contributed to the destruction of exports.
Figure 3: Sanctioned exports to other trading partners in the sample period
As explained in Chapter 3, sanctions act as export barriers and it is expected
that they deflect trade from the target to other partners when the flows to the sender
are destructed. Now, when looking at the export trends to other trading partners
before and after the implementation of the sanctions, there is a clear increase in
both groups but more pronounced in the exports of sanctioned products. This can
be seen from figures 3. and 4. The increase in the average exports between periods
before and after sanctions, in the sanction and control group was around 67% and
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Figure 4: Non-sanctioned exports to other trading partners in the sample period
44 %, respectively. This suggests that the sanctions have indeed a trade deflecting
effect in addition to other factors that also led to the increase in control group.
In the light of the descriptive analysis, trade destruction seems to be caused to
some extent by the sanctions but because of the coinciding Russian financial crisis
the magnitude of destruction cannot be surely quantified. Trade deflection in the
sanctioned product groups was more pronounced compared to the control group and
to further investigate this relationship I will move to econometric analysis of trade
deflection.
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5 Trade deflection
To estimate the export deflection in the sanctioned product groups, I ran difference-
in-differences estimations with different specifications to see how the sanctioned
product groups were affected after the sanctions were imposed compared to the
control group. This approach enables the identification of the counter-sanctions’
effect on the rise in exports in the sanctioned products groups while controlling for
other possible factors affecting the increase in export flows to other trade partners.
The results of the main estimation are presented in Column 1 in Table 3 11.
DID, the coefficient of interest, is the difference in exports of non-sanctioned
products before the sanctions versus after the introduction minus the difference in
exports in sanctioned products before the sanctions versus after the introduction of
the sanctions. The coefficient is positive in all of the estimations, as can be seen
from the the columns (1)-(5) in Table 3. The main estimation, PPML, in the column
(1) is of expected sign, although not significant. However, with z-statistics of 1.56,
the coefficient is near to reach significance at the 10 % level.
Columns (2)-(5) present the results of the different OLS regressions. Columns
(2) and (4) shows the results from OLS where the standard errors are clustered on
the partner-time level, while the latter excludes observations with zero trade flows.
Columns (3) and (5) show results where standard errors are clustered on partner
level, and accordingly, the latter excludes zero flows.
The magnitude of trade deflection in the different estimations vary a lot. In
columns (2) and (3) the elasticity for DID is 0.774 in both which gives a a value
of around 117 %12. In columns (4) and (5), where the zeros flows are excluded,
the value for trade deflection is more modest, around 33 %. All of the OLS esti-
mations are significant, but the most robust results are obtained when clustering
the standard errors at the partner-time level, which is not surprising when recall-
ing that it is probable that the errors are correlated on destination-time level. The
near-significant coefficient from the PPML estimation gives value of around 16 %
for trade deflection. The significance level of the PPML estimation could possibly
be better if the clustering or robust standard errors would have been possible at the
partner-time level.
The difference in the coefficients could be explained by PPML’s better capability
to deal with heteroscedasticity and zero trade flows in the data compared to OLS.
11Exports to Russia are excluded from the regression, since the goal is to measure how the
sanctions deflect trade to other trading partners.
12Since the specification is estimated in original multiplicative form, the coefficient needs to be
transformed to obtain the percentage value (eβ − 1)× 100.
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Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) found similar upward bias in the OLS in their
estimation comparisons. The OLS with zero trade flows included as ln(Exports+1)
compared OLS with ln(Exports) are in similar way upward biased as in the original
simulation. They argue that PPML gives a less biased and more theory consistent
results.
Table 3: Regression table
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PPML OLS OLS OLS OLS
xijt ln(xijt + 1) ln(xijt + 1) ln(xijt) ln(xijt)
lnGDPj 0.0915 1.513∗ 1.513 1.286 1.286∗∗
(0.552) (0.763) (1.250) (0.768) (0.408)
DID 0.147 0.774∗∗∗ 0.774∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.287∗
(0.0978) (0.138) (0.269) (0.0791) (0.135)
D-P FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zero trade Yes Yes Yes No No
SE clustering Partner Partner-time Partner Partner-time Partner
Observations 3450 3546 3546 3012 3012
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.040 0.037 0.037
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The findings are still in line with the expected outcome: Russian counter-
sanctions have had a trade deflecting effect to other trading partners of Finland.
The magnitude of the effect is however somewhat a question mark. When compar-
ing the results of the different specifications, the effect is somewhere between the
results of the PPML and OLS with zero trade flows included, but more probably
closer to the PPML estimations coefficient, because OLS tends to give biased results
and from the fact that 117 % trade deflection estimation given by the OLS is most
definitely an exaggerated number.
5.1 Robustness and limitations
In addition to the PPML and OLS estimations, I ran two OLS regressions with
theory consistent importer-time fixed effects suggested by Faully (2015) for robust-
ness check, again one with clustering on the partner-time level and another on the
partner level.
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Table 4: Robustness check with exporter-time FE’s
(1) (2)
OLS OLS
DID 0.706∗∗∗ 0.706
(0.189) (0.359)
Destination-time FE’s Yes Yes
SE clustering Partner-time Partner
Observations 3840 3840
Adjusted R2 0.216 0.216
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The results in column (1) of table 5 propose that 101% of the sanctioned exports
would have deflected. This number does not vary excessively from the OLS results
with separate destination-product and time fixed effects, but is also likely to be
exaggerated. However, it brings the estimation closer to PPML estimation. Again,
the previous empirical evidence and simulations suggest that the trade deflection
due to sanctions is likely to be closer the PPML estimations results than the OLS
results.
I would also like to address some limitations of my empirical analysis of trade
deflection. First, the sample of partners include lot of countries that are facing the
sanctions as well. This could arguably affect make it harder for Finnish producers
to enter these markets, when these markets suffer of oversupply of the sudden faced
sanctions, hence there is less probability that the exports would deflect to these
countries. By adding more countries to the data set, a more accurate estimation of
the trade deflection could be possible. However, since the selected trading partners
include all the major trading partners of Finland, the data includes the major portion
of trade in the sanctioned product and control group.
Second, intra-national trade is not accounted for in this study. When analyzing
policy effects, some scholars advise to use intra-national data, because it is consistent
with the theory (Dai et al., 2015) and decreases biases in the estimation of trade
policies (Bergstrand et al., 2015). Since the Finnish intra-national trade is not
included in the estimation, it is impossible to account for possible deflection of
trade to the domestic markets. This might lead to upward bias in the estimated
effect of trade deflection to other countries.
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6 Conclusions
The aim of this essay is to assess, first the trade destructive and, second, deflecting
effects of Russian sanctions on Finnish exports of the sanctioned product groups to
compared to non-sanctioned product groups. A tertiary aim is to comment if the
sanctions are effective. The data set covers period from January 2013 to December
2016.
The empirical results show that exports to Russia in the sanctioned product
groups as well as in the control group decreased after the sanctions were imposed,
hence trade destruction was evident in the light of the descriptive part of the essay.
There is little surprise in this result, since sanctions were designed to restrict im-
ports to Russia and are relatively easy to enforce by border control. The trade to
Russia decreased to almost zero in the sanctioned product groups. The results of
the difference-in-difference estimation of the gravity model on the trade deflection
effects support the theory of trade deflection in case of increase in trade barrier.
This is in line with previous research of trade deflection in the case of sanctions
and other measures of trade restrictions. Due to insignificance in the benchmark
PPML estimation, it is unreliable to accurately measure the magnitude of the trade
deflection. However, the robust OLS estimations support the existence of export
deflection, although the effect of sanctions is likely to be exaggerated.
As the primary objective of the Russian counter-sanctions is to punish the coun-
tries imposing sanctions on Russia, I comment this success in the context of Finland.
The evidence of deflection of the destructed trade suggests that the trade sanctions
sent by Russia are not as effective as purposed. When recalling that one of the
most important characteristics of successful sanctions are the ability to inflict dam-
age to the target, the sanctions cannot be seen as successful against that measure.
This outcome contributes to the strong consensus in the empirical literature that
sanctions are relatively ineffective as international policy tools. However, as the
implementation of economic sanctions seems to only increase in the international
politics, further research of the trade disruptive effects of sanctions should be con-
ducted to better understand why sanctions are sent.
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Unofficial translation 
On measures for implementation of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated 
August 6, 2014 № 560 "On the application of certain special economic measures to ensure the 
security of the Russian Federation" 
 
Pursuant to the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on August 6, 2014 № 560 "On the 
application of certain special economic measures to ensure the security of the Russian Federation", 
the Government of the Russian Federation decrees as follows:  
1. To introduce for one year a ban on imports into the Russian Federation of agricultural 
products, raw materials and food, originating from the United States, the countries of the 
European Union, Canada, Australia and the Kingdom of Norway, in line with the annexed list. 
2. The Federal Customs Service to ensure control over the implementation of Item 1 of this 
Resolution. 
3. The Governmental Commission on Monitoring and Rapid Response to changing conditions 
on food markets together with the high executive authorities of the subjects of the Russian 
Federation to ensure a balance of commodity markets and to prevent the acceleration of 
growth in prices of agricultural products, raw materials and foodstuffs. 
4. The Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Agriculture 
of the Russian Federation together with the high executive bodies of the subjects of the 
Russian Federation to organize the implementation of the daily operational monitoring and 
control over the state of the markets of agricultural products, raw materials and food 
5. The Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation together with interested federal 
executive authorities and with participation of associations of producers of agricultural 
products, raw materials and food to develop and implement a set of measures aimed at 
increasing the supply of agricultural products, raw materials and food in order to prevent a 
rise in prices 
6. The Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Agriculture of 
the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation 
and the Federal Antimonopoly Service with participation of retail chains and trade 
organizations to ensure the coordination of activities in order to curb rising prices. 
7. This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its official publication. 
 
D.Medvedev 
Chair of the Government 
Of the Russian Federation 
 
 
 
 
A Unofficial translation of decree no. 778
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List of agricultural products, raw materials and foodstuffs originating from the United States, 
countries of the European Union, Canada, Australia and the Kingdom of Norway, and that are 
banned for imports to the Russian Federation for a period of one year 
CN CODE List of products *) ***) 
0201 Meat of bovine animals, fresh or chilled 
0202 Meat of bovine animals, frozen 
0203 Pork, fresh, chilled or frozen 
0207 Meat and edible offal of the poultry indicated in line 0105, 
fresh, chilled or frozen 
Out of 0210 ** Meat salted, in brine, dried or smoked 
0301, 0302, 
0303, 0304, 
0305, 0306, 
0307, 0308 
Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic 
invertebrates 
0401, 0402, 
0403, 0404, 
0405, 0406 
Milk and dairy products 
0701,  
0702 00 000,  
0703, 0704, 
0705, 0706,  
0707 00, 
0708, 0709, 
0710, 0711, 
0712, 0713, 
0714 
Vegetables, edible roots and tubers 
0801, 0802, 
0803, 0804, 
0805, 0806, 
0807, 0808, 
0809, 0810, 
0811, 0813 
Fruit and nuts 
1601 00 Sausages and similar products of meat, meat offal or blood; 
final food products based thereon 
1901 90 110 0,  
1901 90 910 0 
Finished products, including cheese and curd(cottage cheese) 
based on vegetable fats 
2106 90 920 0,  
2106 90 980 4,  
2106 90 980 5,  
2106 90 980 9 
Foods (milk containing products on the basis of vegetable 
fats) 
 
* For the purposes of the application of this list, one should be guided solely by the CN CODE, name 
of product is shown for convenience.  
** For the purposes of the application of this position, one should be guided both by a CN CODE, and 
the name of the product.  
*** Except for goods destined for baby food. 
B Data sources
Data Source URL
Finnish monthly Finnish customs http://uljas.tulli.fi/
exports statistical database
GDP’s Eurostat http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
nui/show.do?dataset=naidq_10_gdp&lang=en
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